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Throughout the ascendancy of mankind, migration has been among the most
distinguishing behavioral characteristics of the human species. The noted historian William
McNeill, in describing the pre-modern experience, has written that "it is safe to assume that
when our ancestors first became fully human they were already migratory" because they were
already hunters and, he adds, that "no dominant species ever spread so far so fast" as have
human beings.1 From these early times until the modern era, there was little concern about how
migrants might be received wherever they arrived. If the land area was unoccupied, the
migrants simply settled it; if it was occupied, the newcomers might be absorbed if they came as
individuals but, if they came in numbers, they often had to fight to displace those already there
with the outcome of the struggle often being death, enslavement, or exile for the losers. Indeed,
much of the recorded history of mankind is a story of repeated invasions of one people by
another. Looked at from this long run perspective, all existing countries are "nations of
immigrants". It is only a matter of the length of the time frame that is being examined.
But in a finite spatial world that, in modern times, has been politically demarcated into
nation states and economically organized by industrialization and urbanization pressures, the
movement of people and workers was destined to encounter both natural limitations and
man-made institutional barriers. Indeed, the confrontation between the urge to migrate by
millions of people and the mounting resistance to their efforts in the late 20th Century has,
according to the United Nations Population Fund, the likelihood of becoming the "human crisis
of our age."2  For unlike the general experiences of earlier epochs, "today's migrants are
pushing into territory already occupied by others" and "the recipient areas and countries are
already under stress."3
As of 1992, it is estimated that the available labor force of the world is about 2.5 billion
workers (who are either employed or unemployed at any given time). Of this number about 100
million persons are estimated to be international migrants who are living in a country other than
their country of origin.4 To the receiving countries, these persons are the sum of the legal
immigrants; refugees; asylum seekers; illegal immigrants, and temporary (i.e., non-immigrant)
workers (who are foreign nationals legally permitted to work in the receiving country for a
specified period). Although precise data are unavailable and definitions of residency status differ
between nations, it is conservatively estimated that this stock is increasing by about 2 million
international migrants a year.5 Due to the prevalence of uncounted illegal immigrants, the actual
number is far higher. There is every reason to believe that the annual flow will grow throughout
the foreseeable future.
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While the number of international migrants is substantial, it is important from the outset
to keep the issue in perspective. The vast preponderance of the world's labor force is not
involved. This remains true despite what would seem to be, given the magnitudes of the
disparities and the nature of the pressures involved, overpowering reasons for many more to do
so. Moreover, only a few nations serve as receiving countries on a regular basis. Most do not.
But it is precisely because there are so few countries that are the destinations of most migrants
that the numbers of those who do migrate assume significance and the impact of their presence
becomes of consequence. It is also the case that most receiving countries are confronted with
numerous other domestic issues that the presence of immigrants can sometimes improve but
more often make worse.
The Causes of Increasing World Migration
Before proceeding with the specific objective of examining the effects of contemporary
migration on receiving nations, it is essential to mention the major forces that are responsible for
propelling so many persons annually into the international migrant streams. For these forces
form the context in which the phenomena takes place and, in part, explain the scale and the
character of the immigrant flow to which the receiving countries must react.
Paramount among the "push" factors is the population explosion that is occurring
primarily in the less economically developed nations of the world. The world's population of
about 5.5 billion people in 1993 is growing by about 98 million persons a year. Of this number,
93 percent of the growth in 1990 occurred in the less developed nations of the world (it is
projected to be 95 percent by 2000).6
The world's population is also rapidly urbanizing. By the beginning of the 21st Century, it
is estimated that over half the world's population will live in cities. In the 1 990s, 83 percent of
the growth in the world's population is projected to occur in cities. One-third of the world's urban
population currently live in cities of more than one million people. The movement from rural to
urban population centers is a characteristic of virtually all national economies. But the shift is
most acute, in terms of the numbers of people involved, in the less developed nations where
their "cities' capacity to provide economic opportunities and even modest levels of support
services to newcomers [from their rural sectors] is declining rather than increasing."7
There is also the issue of refugee movements. In 1991 the United Nations estimated that
there were 17 million refugees outside of their native countries in the world with 87 percent of
them being located in less developed nations.8 The instability of the governments in many less
developed nations is frequently cited as the cause of these
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refugee outflows. The instability is caused as much by social and economic conditions as it is by
political factors themselves. Sometimes the ensuing violence is the result of ethnic and religious
differences between factions within countries. But more often than not, the root cause of the
political instability stems from the soaring population growth rate in these countries that serves
as persistent negative influence on any efforts to achieve sustainable economic growth and
development. The growth in population is directly linked to the inability of governments to
provide adequate health, housing, and education. It also instigates conflicts over land use and
ownership. Without population controls, emigration becomes an ever-app aling option. For
some it appears to be a Hobson's Choice.
Lastly, of course, there is the fact that migration pressures are spawned by the mounting
economic inequities between those who live in "have" countries and those who live in "have not"
countries. Between 1950 and 1993, "per capita income in the rich countries has almost tripled
while in the poorer countries there has been no improvement."9 Enhanced communication
systems in the world now enable those in poorer countries to see what they do not have and
improved transportation systems now provide the means by which many persons in these
countries may actually avail themselves of opportunities for a better life. Once the process
begins, information networks quickly develop among families and friends that seek to
perpetuate and expand the movements if the chances to so are available.
While international migration cannot possibly resolve the dilemmas posed by the
magnitude of these aforementioned pressures, it is viewed by many individuals as a remedy to
their specific plight. But such migration can only occur if there is a place to go.
The Theoretical Effects of Immigration on Receiving Nations
If standard economic theory of labor market operations (i.e., neoclassical economic
theory) is applied to the analysis of the migration process, the effects of immigration on
receiving nations are the same as any other exogenous increase in the supply of labor. If
unrestricted by governmental policies, the operation of supply-and-demand forces will lead to
the establishment of an equilibrium position between the sending and receiving nations. Those
countries with a slow rate of economic growth and a surplus of labor will witness out-migrati n
to those countries with higher economic growth rates and labor shortages. A self-adjusting
process will occur. Spatial differences between the demand for and the supply of labor will
automatically be reconciled between the sending and the receiving nations. Any effort by a
receiving nation to protect its labor force from the adverse competitive effects of mass
immigration are viewed a self-de eating. For in the absence of market forces to reduce wages
and to lower work standards (i.e., costs), businesses will invest in capital-intensive rather than
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labor intensive forms of technology in order to compete in an increasingly internationally
competitive market place. Restrictions on immigration, therefore, would cause unemployment in
any country that sought to impose them. They would be a cause of inefficiency. Trade union or
government policies that seek to protect prevailing wages, employment standards, and working
conditions by restricting immigration would, in turn, be blamed for the ensuing unemployment
that is the result of their actions that inhibit what would otherwise be a self-equilibrating
adjusting process that, theoretically, provides full employment.
Conceptually, the arguments used to support free trade between nations (by eliminating
tariffs and quotas on imports and government subsidies on exports) are identical to those that
provide the theoretical rationale for the unimpeded movement of labor between nations (by
eliminating immigration and emigration restrictions on the entry and exit of labor). Ultimately, the
result of the application of this theoretical paradigm can only be that wage rates in high wage
countries (e.g., the advanced industrial democracies) are reduced and in low wage countries
(e.g., Third World nations) they are raised. The same can be said for other labor and
employment standards (i.e., occupational health, safety, child labor, wage, and working hours
laws) that exist between nations. There will be pressures toward equalization which means
lower labor standards in the industrial democracies but, theoretically, improvement in
employment conditions in the less developed world.
One advocate in the United States for the pursuit of this policy of free movement of
international labor is the editorial staff of the influential business publication, The Wall
Street Journal. In a widely cited editorial in 1988 that was critical of U.S. governmental
efforts to legislate against illegal immigration, it stated "if Washington still wants to do
something about immigration, we propose a five word Constitutional Amendment: 'There
shall be open borders.’”10 Julian Simon, who is associated with the libertarian-o ie ted
Cato Institute, is also an outspoken advocate of the pursuit of this open door policy for the
United States.11
Ironically, it has been various members of the Department of Economics at the
University of Chicago over the years -- who are otherwise known throughout the
economics profession as the champions of the pursuit of free market economic policies -
who have spoken out most forcefully against the neoclassical position calling for no
restrictions by receiving countries on the international movement of labor. Henry Simons,
one of the intellectual founders of the "Chicago School," bluntly stated that:
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Wholly free immigration, however, is neither attainable or desirable. To insist that
a free trade program is logically or practically incomplete without free migration is
either disingenuous or stupid. Free trade may and should raise living standards
everywhere ....Free immigration would level standards, perhaps without raising
them anywhere.12
It is Henry Simons' recommendation, therefore, that "as regards immigration policy, the
less said the better."13  Milton Freidman, Simons' intellectual heir at Chicago, has taken Simons'
advice to heart. Although Friedman is known to share Simons' views on the topic, he completely
ignored immigration policy in his famous book, Capitalism and Freedom, in which he outlines
the role of government policy in a market-o i nted society.14  The same can be said for his
treatment of immigration in his subsequent best seller, Fr e to Choose. In it, only a few positive
anecdotes are made about the adjustment experience of a few immigrants at the turn of the
20th Century but the overall impact of immigration on the U.S. economy is ignored.15 Much of
the advancement in real wages and expanded job opportunities that Friedman attributes to the
free market economic system for U.S. workers in general and black workers in particular over
the middle decades of the 20th Century took place during the years when the U.S. had highly
restrictive immigration policies in place and immigration levels were rapidly declining. But the
positive labor market outcomes of these governmental interventions to restrict immigration in the
United States are simply ignored. It is also bewildering that the praise Freidman heaps upon
Margaret Thatcher for the free market policies she championed as Prime Minister of Great
Britain during the 1980s does not mention the highly restrictive immigration policies she put in
place during her tenure. To this day, Britain's immigration policies remain the most restrictive in
Western Europe. 16
Likewise, Melvin Reder -- also of the Chicago economics' faculty -- has pointed out that
"free immigration would cause a rapid equalization of per capita income across countries
accomplished primarily by leveling downward the income of the more affluent" and, for this
reason, he concluded that "I resist this proposal."17  Earlier Reder had written in 1963 -- before
mass immigration to the United States resumed later in that same decade -- that "a great flow of
immigration will injure labor market competitors with immigrants; these are, predominately
Negroes, Puerto Ricans, unskilled immigrants presently able to enter the country, and native
rural-urban migrants (Negro and White). "18  He also noted that the employment and income
opportunities of "married women, youth, and aged persons" would be adversely affected by
substantial increases in immigration.19 Reder also points out that the United States and other
"Western democracies" had, prior to the 1960s, made substantial progress toward improving the
inequalities in income distribution within these nations as the result of "deliberate state action" to
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restrict immigration over the prior 50 years."20 Thus, there are significant equity issues that arise
for receiving nations when immigration occurs -- especially for multi-racial and multi-ethnic
nations like the United States and Canada.
On the very day that it was announced that Gary Becker, another member of the
Chicago economics' faculty, had won the 1992 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, he
published a commentary in The Wall Street Journal that explained why restrictive immigration
policies were essential for the contemporary United States experience and for the other
industrialized democracies who are would-be estinations for millions of immigrants from the
Third World. He contrasted the economic setting of the large scale the immigration experience
of the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century with the economic setting at the end of
the Century. He observed:
But the world is now a very different place. Because of the expanded welfare
state, immigration is no longer a practical policy. These days open immigration
would merely induce people in poorer countries to emigrate to the United States
and other developed countries to collect generous transfer payments.21
Hence, there are historical realities associated with the differential development of social
policies between nations that may be affected by immigration.
Given these views, it is not surprising that the role of immigration as a potential influence
on the supply of labor to would-be receiving nations is one of the least examined features of
contemporary mainstream economic analysis. The leading advocates of the neoclassical
paradigm of labor market operations have essentially agreed to say as little as possible on the
subject. This posture clearly reflects a normative judgment on their part that such equilibrating
adjustments are not in the national interests of these receiving nations despite the alleged
benefits that this model usually propounds for those who adopt its non-interve tionist principles.
In other words, immigration is a time-sensitive topic. Its merits depend on past historical events
as well as prevailing institutional arrangements and present circumstances -- not theoretical
dogma. As the renowned scholar of the history of economic analysis, Joseph Schumpeter, has
stated, unless the examination of a particular economic issue "presents a minimum of historical
aspects, no amount of correctness, originality, rigor, or elegance will prevent a sense of lacking
direction and meaning" to what is being examined.22  Such is certainly the case with the study of
immigration.
Thus, the standard neoclassical model, the bulwark of free market economic analysis,
has an Achilles Heel. It is immigration. Even the strongest intellectual advocates of the
application of free market economics have made immigration the exception to the belief that
neoclassical economic model should be the universal paradigm for the design of national and
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international economic policies. For in this realm of economic concerns, even neoclassicalists
seem willing to concede that support for international labor migration is a relative concept.
The efficacy of international labor immigration, therefore, depends upon a pragmatic
assessment of both the institutional arrangements and the prevailing economic context in the
receiving countries at a given time. Some times, immigration may be a desirable public policy
option; other times it may not be. The unrestricted movement of international labor, therefore, is
not a universal principle to be pursed simply for the sake of seeking enhanced efficiency in the
worldwide labor market. There are other factors associated with perceived national interests to
be considered which may be far more influential and beneficial to receiving nations than any
theoretical or real loss in labor utilization that might result as a consequence of restricting
international labor mobility. As Reder has eloquently written, "immigration policy inevitably
reflects a kind of national selfishness of which the major beneficiaries are the least fortunate
among us. We could not completely abandon this policy even if we desired to do so."23
Hence, the alleged benefits of enhanced labor mobility in free market economies is
limited by the existence of international political boundaries. In the present era of nation states,
only in special cases has the domestic labor market of countries been opened to workers from
other nations to enter. Even in these cases, changing circumstances can and usually do lead to
changes in receptivity attitudes over time.
The Receiving Countries and the Circumstances
Under Which Immigrants Are Admitted
Aside from the political asylum issue (which is a special case that disproportionately
affects entry into neighboring nations to any country beset by political turmoil), there are
essentially three geographic clusters of nations that, from a numerical standpoint, currently
receive most of the world's immigrants (see Table 1). Each reflects a particular set of historical
circumstances and institutional arrangements that have shaped their individual attitudes. There
is no overarching pattern to explain why a few countries permit significant numbers of workers
from other countries to enter their countries while the vast preponderance of nations in the world
do not. Each case is, therefore, time sensitive. As conditions change, so does the degree of
receptivity of these receiving nations. For the same reason, nations who do not presently
receive immigrants may in the future elect to do. There are no universal principles involved in
the process that are true for all times and for all countries.
The North America Case
As Philip Martin has noted "the United States and Canada [currently]... accept about 1
million immigrants annually, or about 90 percent of all the immigrants that the industrial
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democracies plan to accept" in the early 1990s.24 Both countries also experience significant
additional inflows of illegal immigration which they have sought to combat but not with much
success. Each country, however, has taken an entirely different policy approach to immigrant
admissions.
In the case of the United States, immigration played a major role in the pre-
industrialization era of the emergence of the nation as the world's economic super power.25
Following the end of its colonial era in 1776, the new nation expanded geographically across the
North American continent to embrace a vast land area that encompassed an enormous amount
of natural resources, rich soil, large quantities of fresh water, and a temperate climate but
relatively few people (the small indigenous population which resisted incorporation has never
been included in the economic development of the nation).
Created as an independent nation at exactly the same time that the Industrial Revolution
occurred in England and in parts of Continental Europe, the United States was "born running"
with these new technological developments. But it needed a vast urban labor force to capitalize
on the productive capabilities of machine technology. To make a long story short, immigrants in
the 19th and early 20th centuries became the source of the needed urban labor supply during
these crucial formative years of the U.S. economy. As Stanley Lebergott has observed in his
epic study of the development of the U.S. labor force, "somewhat surprisingly, the greatest
beneficiaries of the flow of immigrant labor [in the 19th Century] was never agriculture though
farming was our primary industry."26  Rather, it was the urban economy in general and the
manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation industries in particular that expanded by
their presence. But when the frontiers of the country were overcome at the turn of the 20th
Century, it was not long before immigration was sharply restricted -- beginning in 1914. In part
the restrictions reflected legitimate economic concerns that the mass immigration of the
previous three decades had depressed wages, hampered unionization, and caused
unemployment; in part they also reflected nativist social reactions to the ethnic, racial, and
religious diversity that the mass immigration of that era also brought.27  For t e next 60 years,
the significance of immigration rapidly receded and the expansion of the economy turned to the
utilization of domestic labor reserves -- most specifically those in the nation's vast rural areas
where workers were being displaced by this time by the rapid mechanization of agriculture that
had begun in earnest in the 1880s and which continues to this day. One of the major
beneficiaries of the cessation of mass immigration was the nation's black population who, since
being freed from slavery in 1865, were still concentrated in the rural South. It was not until mass
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immigration ended in 1914 that "the Great Migration" of blacks to the North and the West could
commence.28
Indicative of the declining significance of immigration on American life following the
restrictions imposed in the 1920s is the fact that the percentage of the U.S. population that was
foreign born consistently fell from 13.2 percent in 1920 to 4.7 percent in 1970. During this period
from 1920 to 1970, the U.S. economy sustained the greatest increases in real wages,
employment levels, and production output in its entire economic history. It was also the time
period when the nation adopted an extensive array of progressive social policies pertaining to
labor standards, collective bargaining and civil rights.29
It was not until the mid-1960s that the mass immigration phenomenon was accidentally
revived as a result of domestic political events and immigration once again became a significant
feature of the U.S. economy.30  A new admission system was put into place in 1965 which
provided that family reunification would be the primary criterion for the admission of legal
immigrants. This change inadvertently opened the door of immigration priority to persons of the
Western Hemisphere (from Mexico and various Caribbean countries in particular) who had not
been covered by the earlier legislative efforts to restrict Eastern Hemisphere immigration and
who, by the 1960s, had established significant immigrant communities in selected urban areas
of the U.S. Originally family admissions were allocated 74 percent of all available visas. In 1980,
when refugee admissions were separated from the legal admission categories, the percentage
of visas for family members rose to 80 percent. It is also important to note that many of the
refugees who were admitted during the post-1965 era were from Southeast Asia (as a result of
the Vietnam war debacle in which the United States had become ensnared). These refugees, in
turn, were able to use their admission as an opportunity to secure the subsequent admission of
their extended family members. In 1990, a new category of "diversity immigrants" was added to
the nation's immigration system. It is supposed to correct the inadvertent effect caused by the
adoption of the family admission system in 1965 which greatly favored immigration from Asia
and Latin America (during the 1980s, about 85 percent of immigrants to the United States came
from these two regions). The diversity admission category is supposed to increase the flow of
immigrants from the traditional pre1965 source countries in Europe and Africa. With the
Immigration Act of 1990, therefore, the percentage of admission visas allocated on criteria other
than actual labor market needs remained at 80 percent (it will be 79 percent beginning in 1995).
Thus, only about 20 percent of the available visas (i.e., 140,000 visas) each year are allocated
on the basis of actual labor market needs (and even this 20 percent figure overstates the actual
number admitted for this economic purpose since all accompanying family members -- spouse
International Migration and Labor Mobility WP 94-19
Page 11
and children -- of employment-based immigrants are counted as part of the 140,000 visa figure).
Thus, the legal admission system which, since 1990, provides for the annual admission of
700,000 immigrants a year (it declines to 675,000 immigrants beginning in 1995) is designed
primarily to serve political goals despite the fact that annual immigrant flows of this aggregate
magnitude have significant economic implications. It is also important to note when considering
the overall effect of immigration on the U.S. labor market and economy to remember that the
figures do not include the annual admission of about 130,000 refugees; 10,000 asylees (with a
backlog of about 300,000 asylee applicants pending in mid-1994); about 450,000 non-immigrant
workers permitted to work legally in the U.S. each year; or an estimated 300,000 illegal
immigrants who enter each year to join about 4 million illegal immigrants already in the country).
It is also the case that the United States granted an amnesty to about 3 million former illegal
aliens in 1986 which permitted them to begin the process of legally adjusting their status over
the following several years (i.e., different categories of illegal immigrants were given different
time periods in which to begin and to complete the legal adjustment process). As a result, it is
estimated that over 10 million immigrants entered the United States in the 1980s (not counting
non-immigrant workers whose numbers were also increased by the 1990 legislation) which
made it the highest number of immigrants admitted in any single decade in the country's history.
By 1990, the foreign born officially accounted for 7.9 percent of the population (with the real rate
undoubtedly higher due to uncounted illegal immigrants). Moreover, in 1991, over 1.8 million
persons entered the country or adjusted their status to become permanent resident aliens -- the
highest number of immigrants to do so in any single year in the country's history. Hence, the
decade of the 1 990s should set yet a new record. It is not surprising, therefore, that an
international social science research team, Oxford Analytica, observed in its comprehensive
study of American life that "America's biggest import is people" and concluded that "at a time
when attention is directed to the general decline in American exceptionalism, American
immigration continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world."31
In addition to the United States, Canada has been a net receiver immigrants for
permanent settlement every year since 1950. In the process, its population has doubled and, by
1990, its foreign born residents had soared to 16.2 percent of the country's population. The
post-World War II decision to open Canada to immigration was prompted by the nation's
business sector in response to a perceived labor shortage at that time. The admission system
that has evolved contrasts sharply with that of the United States. As David Reimers and Harold
Tropper have written, "economic issues have been far more important to Canadians than to
Americans."32 Consequently, the Canadian system does not have a fixed annual ceiling but
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rather one that allows the number to be admitted to be annually determined by administrative
decisions. The three admission categories – family reunification, economic, and humanitarian --
can also be adjusted annually to respond to evolving circumstances. In practice, family
reunification has been used far less in Canada than in the United States (in 1989, for example,
only 32 percent of the admitted immigrants came under family reunification provisions while 49
percent were admitted on the basis of actual employment needs of business) with the remainder
being admitted on humanitarian grounds.33 A point system that rewards human capital attributes
and labor market needs is used to determine those who are admitted for economic purposes.
Although the annual number of admissions fluctuate, it has been tending to rise in recent years
(from 84,000 in 1985 to almost 250,000 in 1992.
Western Europe
The United Nations Population Fund estimates that "some 15 million people entered
Western Europe as migrants between 1980 and 1992.”34 They have joined an almost equal
number of foreign born persons already living in these countries. The former West Germany has
been the principle recipient of the immigrant flow. By 1990 the foreign resident population of the
country was 5.2 million (or 8.4 percent -- a figure that does not include foreign born persons who
have already been naturalized). The second largest receiver of immigrants has been France. In
1990, "foreign residents" made up 6.4 percent of the French population while there were more
than one million additional foreign born persons who had already acquired citizenship and
another half million French citizens living in the country who were born in the various French
overseas territories and departments.
For much of the 19th and early 20th Centuries, Western Europe was an area of
emigration. But with the events associated with World War II, this pattern unexpectantly
changed. The story has been extensively told elsewhere.35 In brief, the physical rebuilding of
Western Europe in the aftermath of the extensive destruction of the war led to an increase in the
demand for labor. The enormous loss of human life during the war, however, meant that the
supply of labor in these countries was unable to respond in the short run. Chronic labor
shortages developed and inflationary wage pressures were triggered. As a result, most Western
European countries entered into a program of importing non-immigrant workers under
contractual agreements from the less developed regions around the Mediterranean Basin.
There was never any intention that these "temporary workers" would remain or that they would
bring their families with them for settlement purposes. These workers were supposed to be
regularly rotated so that they would not become attached to the Western European labor
market. Typically, the rotation did not occur. When the Arab oil boycott of 1973 caused both
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prices and unemployment to soar in Western Europe, the reaction was to cause these countries
to abandon (or greatly reduce) their reliance on the use of non-immigrant labor. But starting
such a labor importation program proved to be much easier than stopping it.36 By 1973, many of
the so-called "guest-workers" had established deep roots in the receiving countries and
indicated they would not leave voluntarily.37 Many employers had become addicted to their
availability. Hence, the foreign born population of Western Europe has continued to grow since
1973 because most European nations have permitted subsequent family reunification to take
place; illegal immigration has flourished; and a large wave of asylum seekers have fled the
political turmoil of this era in Eastern Europe, the Near East, and parts of Northern Africa to
most European nations but to Germany in particular.
In response to the unanticipated growth in the foreign born population and in conjunction
with the coterminous formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), Western
European countries have moved to create uniform as well as restrictive immigration and refugee
policies for persons from non-member nations while simultaneously easing restrictions on the
movement of people and workers between EEC member nations.38 Germany and France, in
particular, have taken steps in the early 1990s to significantly restrict immigrant inflows. In July
1993, Germany overhauled its hitherto liberal political asylum policies in favor of a much more
restrictive policy and France announced in 1993 a new "zero-net immigration policy."39 Most
other countries in Western Europe have also taken steps to tighten their policies pertaining to
illegal immigration and to limit political asylum eligibility.
The Oil Producing Nations of the Near East
Several of the oil producing countries of the Near East have, collectively, become major
receivers of non immigrant workers for work in their petroleum and construction industries as
well as to perform household service. These countries have small native-born populations but,
because of the accumulation of wealth derived from their oil exports in the 20th Century, they
have had difficulty finding native-born workers willing to fill jobs that require physical effort or
that are of a menial nature. It is estimated that 45 percent of the non-immigrant workers in the
region are employed in Saudi Arabia.40 Libya, the United Arab Emigrates, and Iraq also being
major recipients of such foreign workers. Most of these workers have been drawn from Third
World nations (such as Pakistan, Korea, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Egypt, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand). It is estimated that nonimmigrant workers account for as much as 36 percent of the
labor force in Saudi Arabia and 55 percent in Libya.41 There is little prospect that many of these
workers will have the opportunity to remain permanently in these countries nor are they free to
work in occupations or industries other than those to which they have been contracted.
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Other Receiving Nations
There are several other receiver countries that deserve brief mention even though the
scale of the respective flows into these countries is small when compared to the situations in the
aforementioned primary receiver countries. In some instances, their experiences are similar to
those of the major receivers but in others they differ significantly.
Australia is a country that significantly revised its immigration policy in 1958 away from
its restrictive past (with respect to whom and how many immigrants it would admit). In the
1970s, the government initiated an "active" immigration policy. In 1970-1, for example,
immigration reached a high for a single year of 174,000 immigration admissions. Like Canada,
Australia has an administrative policy that allows the level of immigration to vary annually as
determined by administrative priorities. Annual immigration ceilings in the 1 980s were around
120,000 a year but in 1992 the figure was set at 80,000. The numerical importance of
immigration to Australia can be gauged from the fact that in 1987, the foreign born population
accounted for over 21 percent of its total population.
For many of the years after its immigration policy was revised in 1958, the basis for
admission was primarily economic. It was designed essentially to meet labor market needs --
both for low skilled and highly skilled workers.42 But by late 1975 the political decision to raise
immigration levels was matched by changes in the selection criteria. Family reunification
emerged as the first priority of the admission system. The decisions were the products of
domestic political factors associated with efforts "to appease" ethnic minorities (both Southern
Europeans and Asians).43 In 1992, over 55 percent of the available visas were allocated to
family migrants. Most of the remainder were reserved for skilled immigrants 138 percent) whose
entry eligibility is determined on a point system that rewards human capital attributes.44
Humanitarian admissions and a small "special eligibility" group make up the balance.
Israel has been a significant receiver of immigrants since it became an independent
state in 1948.45 Immigration, however, plays such a unique role in Israel that its role as a
receiver is mentioned only for the sake of completeness of coverage. At the time of its inception,
Israel found itself being a small land area surrounded by Arab nations hostile to its existence. It
also had a significant Arab (i.e., Palestinians population living within its borders. Hence, its
pro-immigration policy has been based firmly on national security considerations. Its immigration
policy also has unique religious overtones. The country was created on the principle that it
sought to "regather" the descendants of the lost tribes of biblical times. The Law of Return of
1950 guarantees people of the Jewish faith throughout the world the right to immigrate. There
are, therefore, no numerical limits on Jewish immigration. Over 2.2 million immigrants have
International Migration and Labor Mobility WP 94-19
Page 15
entered Israel since 1948 with 418,000 entering between 1989 and 1992. The surge in
immigration since 1989 has been the consequence of the breakup of the former Soviet Union --
Soviet emigres accounting for 88 percent of post-1989 arrivals. Unemployment in Israel has
been high during this recent period and there is extensive evidence of underemployment in its
labor force as many of the recent immigrants have been highly educated, skilled, and talented.
Nonetheless, labor force considerations play no appreciable role in immigration decisions.
Non-Jews may immigrate but relatively few (less than 20 percent) of those who apply are
admitted. Hence, the Israeli experience is not really appropriate to a discussion of labor mobility
despite the fact that it is a major immigrant receiver.
Japan, of course, has been the exception to the rule in the post-World War II era with
regard to its policies on immigration. It too was devastated by the war and it also suffered a
shortage of labor as the result of extensive casualties. But, it conscientiously pursued a policy of
not seeking immigrants to augment its labor force. Instead it followed a reconstruction policy
that was based on capital intensive investments that substituted machines for labor and an
active human resource development strategy designed to enhance upward job mobility for its
work force through educational attainment and skill acquisition. In the process, it has emerged
as the only large advanced industrial economy in Asia. Throughout most of the postwar era,
Japan has consistently had a low unemployment economy -- even in the early 1990s when
unemployment soared in most other advanced industrialized countries.
Despite these tight labor market conditions, Japan has shown no interest in
supplementing its labor force through the use of immigration for the purpose of permanent
settlement. It is the only industrialized democracy to consistently adhere to "a zero immigration
policy.46  It is even reported that official "Japanese entry statistics don't seem to recognize the
concept of an immigrant as opposed to a visitor.”47  The tight labor market of the mid-1980s,
however, has led to limited use of non-immigrant workers (despite government actions to
reduce the incidence of their usage) and to a mounting problem of illegal immigration due to
visa "overstayers" from other Asian nations.48
There are also some other Asian countries that do not formally encourage immigration
but which have experienced significant economic growth which are also turning to the use of
non-immigrant workers and are experiencing growing problems with illegal immigration due to
visa "overstayers". Among these countries are Taiwan and Singapore. It is also reported that
the subject of allowing non-immigrant workers to be employed in Korea has been the subject of
"major debate" within government circles and with the business sector in 1994.49
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In Africa, there is also regional migration. As of the early 1990s, Libya, Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, and South Africa have been the significant receiving countries. The extensive use of
contract workers in Libya has already been discussed in the context of the experiences of the oil
exporting nations. In terms of percentage of its population, the Ivory Coast has the largest
number of foreign born residents (30 percent) in 1990.50  Most of these immigrants are believed
to be illegal entrants. The same can be said for Nigeria. As for South Africa, a substantial
portion of its foreign born population are also believed to be illegal immigrants although the
country has made substantial use of non-immigrant foreign workers for unskilled jobs in certain
industries.
The Effects on the Receiving Nations
While most countries permit foreigners to visit their lands, there is no legal obligation nor
is any international human right that requires such countries to allow foreigners to reside or to
work within their borders. There is usually a perceived national interest objective at a particular
time that explains those decisions to do so. Enabling legislation is required that set forth the
explicit intentions of the receiving nation. But politics being what it is -- "the art of compromise,"
the legislative mandates often include multiple objectives (e.g., to reunify families; to settle
unoccupied land; to meet labor shortages; to accomplish humanitarian goals; or to
accommodate special interest groups). Moreover, despite the best of intentions in drafting
immigration legislation, experience has vividly demonstrated that there are often unintended
consequences associated with whatever is ultimately enacted. Hence, rather than attempt to
evaluate such complex policies on the basis of their expressed objectives, it is preferable to
examine the three issues raised earlier: the effect of immigration on efficiency, equity, and social
policy development.
Efficiency
The clearest rationale for the promotion of labor mobility through the use of immigration
is to increase efficiency in their labor markets. As noted earlier in the theoretical discussion,
immigration can be used as a way to reduce costs (i.e., to become more efficient). But even
members of the “Chicago School” have resisted such an explicit rationale for the use of such
policies. Indeed, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 specifically forbids the entry of
non-family related immigrants (refugees are not covered) into the United States if qualified
citizens are available, able, and willing to the work or if their presence will adversely affect
prevailing wages and/or working conditions.51 Thus, the U.S. Secretary of Labor must certify
that such results will not occur before employment-based immigrants may enter.52 No receiving
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country is willing to explicitly endorse the notion that immigration policy be used to reduce
wages or to worsen working conditions.
But the United States and Canada – the principle receiving countries for planned
immigration – are willing to use immigration as a means of filling existing job vacancies and of
forestalling potential increases in wages or improvements in working conditions for certain
categories of workers that might otherwise occur under conditions of full employment. Thus,
United States and Canada are willing to admit skilled workers whose ranks are not easy to
increase in the short run and whose numbers are costly to increase (because they require
human capital expenditures in order to be prepared for such jobs) in the long run. In recent
years examples of such workers are computer programmers, computer analysts, engineers,
mathematicians, statisticians, university teachers, researchers in technical fields, nurses, and
other health care workers (including doctors). In a sense, this is a way to “brain drain” and “skill
drain” sending countries of their “best and their brightest” talents which may have serious
overtones for the welfare of such sending countries over the long haul but it is obviously a
benefit to the receiving countries.
It is worthy to note, as a corollary, that both the United States and Canada have
recognized that receiving countries should not use immigration policy as a means of recruiting
unskilled workers who are not familiarly related to citizens. Canada uses its point system to
screen out most such unskilled workers while the United States has a specified legislative
mandate since 1990 that no more than 10,000 visas for employment-based visas a year can be
granted to unskilled workers. Despite charges of “elitism” from immigrant advocate groups and
protest from wealthy persons seeking cheap nannies for child care purposes, the rationale for
sharply restricting the entry of such unskilled workers is clear. Unlike skilled work, anyone can
do unskilled work by definition.53 Hence, there is no reason for any advanced industrial nation to
use immigration as a means of attracting unskilled workers for permanent settlement unless the
country is at full employment. Skilled workers who are unemployed may not like to do unskilled
work, but they can do it. The reverse, however, is not true. Unskilled workers cannot fill skilled
jobs when such jobs are vacant. Hence, the welfare of unskilled workers, as Reder noted,
requires governmental protection from immigrants.
The use of immigration policy to meet specific employment needs, however, is only one
aspect of the overall immigration systems of countries like the United States and Canada.
Hence, the actual labor market consequences of the immigration policies of these countries can
be quite different than the aforementioned efforts that nominally seek to protect the domestic
labor force from adverse economic competition. As all immigrants must ultimately work to
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support themselves and their families (or to be supported by those who do), the ultimate
concern is what is the effect of all immigrants on labor markets regardless of what legal
admission criterion or illegal mode that they actually enter under.
In the case of the United States, the assessment of the effect on the labor market is
complicated by the fact that there are two sources of relevant data. One is the data on the
foreign born population that is collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (on a population
basis every 10 years and on a small sample basis as part of a special tabulation of the Curren
Population Survey which, since the 1980s, is conducted on 2 year intervals by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census). The Census data, however, does not distinguish mode of entry. Legal
immigrants, illegal immigrants (if they are counted as some are but many are not), refugees,
asylees, and even non-immigrant workers with temporary residences who are employed in the
U.S. are all lumped together. The other data source is the entry data published by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a by-product of its administrative duties. The
INS data does provide aggregate information on the occupations at the time that legal
immigrants enter the country and refugees who adjust their status to become permanent
resident aliens each year. There is also occupational information on the entry of non-immigra t
workers. There is, however, no information in this series on the occupational characteristics of
the annual flow illegal immigrants into the labor market or of refugees and asylees who have not
yet adjusted their status to become permanent resident aliens.
As the criteria for admission of most immigrants (i.e., those who enter as family
members, diversity immigrants or as refugees) to the United States has nothing to do with their
human capital endowments nor whether there is any need for persons with their skills, talents,
or educational achievements, or whether they are needed in the geographic locations where
they settle, it is not surprising that the mounting tide of research has found a labor market
mismatch. Despite the fact that some immigrants of the post-1965 era do meet the needs of the
rapidly changing U.S. labor market, it is mostly accidental that they do. An increasing number --
more than the majority -- do not. Using Census data, studies have found that the immigrants of
post-1965 era have less schooling, lower earnings, lower labor force participation rates, higher
incidence of poverty, and higher unemployment rates than earlier waves of immigrants at similar
stages of entry.54 Using INS and Census data, studies also show that they are
disproportionately concentrated in occupations and industries that are in decline and are located
in the central cities of urban areas in six major states (California, New York, Texas, Florida, New
Jersey, and Illinois) where unemployment is generally higher than it is in the state in which they
live and of the nation as a whole.55 Given the fact that U.S. immigration policy is essentially
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designed to meet political objectives, it is not surprising that it fails to be consistent with the
nations' evolving economic needs and, in fact, is substantially at odds with those needs. The
1990 Census disclosed, for instance, that 25 percent of all foreign-b n adults (25 years and
older) had less than a 9th grade education (compared to only 10 percent of native born adults).
It also showed that only 58 percent of the foreign born had a high school degree whereas 77
percent of the native born did. Collectively, U.S. immigration policy is supplying a
disproportionate number of poorly educated, unskilled, non-English speaking immigrants into
the labor market at the very time when the labor market says that increasing numbers of such
workers are not needed. Already having a substantial number of unskilled workers (e.g., the
U.S. Department of Education estimates that half the adult population -- or 90 million people --
were not proficient in reading or arithmetic in 1992), it is impossible to justify adding to their
numbers by immigration at this juncture in the nation's economic development. By no stretch of
the imagination can such policy indifference be said to be an efficient way to expand the
nation's labor supply in a service dominated, increasingly technologically-oriented, and
internationally-competitive labor market.
As for Canada, the fact that a point system that rewards human capital factors is used as
the primary entry device would seem to lessen the probability of there being a mismatch
between the immigrant flow and the needs of its labor market. But, as noted earlier, immigration
levels have been sharply rising in Canada and so have the absolute numbers of immigrants and
refugees admitted by other criteria that are not related to actual labor market needs. The fact
that immigration levels continue to rise at the same time that unemployment has also been
increasing into double digit figures in the 1990s suggests that the Canadian immigration system
has become more politically dominated and less concerned about possible incongruities with
the nation's economic needs. To that degree, immigration is contributing to the inefficient use of
labor and unemployment in Canada as it is doing in the United States.
In the case of Australia, the traditional use of labor market criteria to govern entry is also
giving way to the more politically popular family reunification goals as the principle rationale for
its immigration policy. But at least in the case of Australia, the increases in unemployment in the
country in the 1990s have been matched by significant decreases in the annual levels of
immigration which implies that economic considerations have not been entirely abandoned in
the administration of its immigration policy.
As for Western Europe and the Middle East, it does not make any sense to try to assess
their prevailing policies on efficiency grounds. In the case of Western Europe, family
reunification, refugee accommodation and illegal immigration do not provide a means of
International Migration and Labor Mobility WP 94-19
Page 20
assuring that immigrants are being admitted on the basis of labor market needs. Indeed, with
the high unemployment rates that most Western European nations have been experiencing in
the 1990s, it would be difficult to say that their respective labor markets are sustaining any
efficiency gains from immigration. A realistic appraisal would indicate that precisely the opposite
is occurring.
Likewise, the extensive current usage of foreign contract workers in the Near East as a
means of acquiring needed workers on an extended basis has been rejected by the past
experiences of the United States and by Western Europe.56 As their is little prospect that such
non-immigrant workers will ever be allowed to become permanent residents of these countries,
it can be anticipated that illegal immigration will mount and, over time, there will be tendencies
toward political instability in these nations as the economic and social distances between the
"ins" and the "outs" widens.
Equity
One of the more significant social trends in the economic development of the advanced
industrial nations in the 20th Century has been the incorporation of equity concerns into the
formulation and evaluation of public policy initiatives. Who benefits and who loses by
governmental interventions into labor market are questions that are crucial to any overall
assessment of the merits of a particular undertaking.
Equity issues involve not only how immigration policy affects the short term state of
affairs but how does it fit into longer term efforts by the present generation to correct inequities
caused by the actions of past generations. Too much of contemporary economic analysis (i.e.,
the neo-classical paradigm in particular) is ahistorical in its quest to interpret and to quantify
labor market happenings. But once equity considerations are raised, the rationale for policy
actions shifts to including the relevant societal circumstances that exist at a specific time.
As previously noted, the traditional use of immigration by most nations has been as a
means to supply unskilled labor either as permanent settlers or as temporary workers. The oil
exporting nations, as do some of the rapidly developing economies of small nations in Asia, still
pursue this course. Since the revival of immigration by the United States, Canada and Australia
in the post-1960s era and the termination of temporary worker programs in Western Europe in
the mid-1970s, the explicit use of immigration to recruit unskilled workers by these nations has
virtually ceased. The employment-based portions of their immigration systems tend to be
restricted to admitting only more highly educated and skilled workers. But when allowances are
made for the other aspects of their admission systems (family reunification and refugee
provisions) as well as the toleration of the mass abuse of these systems by illegal immigration,
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the picture quickly changes. The preponderance of the entrants resemble, in terms of their
human capital characteristics, the traditional immigration pattern: unskilled and poorly educated
persons, who often do not speak the native language, dominate the flows.
Thus, the equity dimension of contemporary immigration policy focuses on segment of
the labor force that is most impacted by the overall flow of immigrants: the low skilled segment
of the native born labor force who disproportionately hold or seek jobs in the secondary labor
market who carry the accommodation burden. Many of these persons are women, youth, and
minority group members for whom other public policy measures -especially in the United States
-- ostensibly manifest a concern. The impact of immigration on the well-being of these groups,
however, seldom enters the realm of debate over the effects of immigration.
In the United States real family incomes have been falling steadily since 1973 and they
have fallen the most for low income families.57 Real wages have also been declining over this
same time span and they have declined the most for low skilled workers.58 National
unemployment has tended to remain high (when compared to previous periods of prosperity --
ranging in the low 6 percent level in late 1994). Sectorial unemployment rates in central cities
and in the six states (California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey) most
heavily impacted by immigration regularly exceed the national rate. Unemployment rates are the
highest for those with the lowest levels of educational attainment (the usual proxy used to
measure skill). Thus, there is no indication of the existence of any general shortage of labor and
absolutely no shortage of unskilled labor in particular that would warrant the level and type of
immigration that the United States is sustaining.
Historically, the most adversely affected group in the United States by large scale
immigration has been the black population. Given the legacy of slavery and of de jure
segregation, the economic welfare of black Americans virtually defines the notion of equity when
assessing the efficacy of any public policy initiative. Yet, somehow, immigration policy has been
allowed to escape the imperative to meet this crucial test.
The black population was easily positioned to have been incorporated into the economic
mainstream of the United States after being freed from slavery in 1865. The U.S. economy was
just entering the phase of its industrialization in which a vast number and array of new industries
and organizations were created. Most of these jobs in manufacturing, construction, mining and
transportation were of an unskilled nature. The blacks were unskilled and they were already in
the United States (albeit mostly in the South). The most influential spokesman for black America
at the time was the noted educator, Booker T. Washington. In his famous Atlanta Exposition
speech of 1895, he pleaded with the white industrialists of the nation to draw on the abundantly
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available native born black population to fill these nation-buildi g jobs in order to "make the
interests of both races one."59 He warned in a Cassandra-like fashion that the failure to do so
would cause the future black population of the nation to become "a veritable body of death,
stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance the body politic."60 His words were not
heeded. Waves of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were sought and they poured
into the urban labor markets of the North and the West. It was not until this immigration ended in
1914 that the black population could finally begin to migrate out of the South. Every decade
since, there was a positive net migration of blacks out of the South -- that is until the 1980s. As
indicated earlier, the decade of the 1980s saw immigration soar to its highest level in the
nation's history and it also witnessed a negative net migration of blacks out of the South for the
first time in the 20th Century. Reflecting on the historical pattern, Raymond Frost has written
that "there is a competitive relationship between immigration and black migration out of the
South .... When the rate of immigration declines, black migration to the North and West
increases; when the rate of immigration increases, black migration declines."61 In the present
context, blacks are once more losing in the competition for jobs in the urban North and West.
The revival of mass immigration to the United States has had completely unexpected
consequences on the development of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Beginning
in ernest in the South in the late 1950s, the Movement reached its zenith with the passage of
historic legislation in 1964 (regarding public accommodations and employment), in 1965
(regarding voting rights), and in 1968 (regarding fair housing). Although the impetus for these
laws was directed toward the treatment of black Americans, the legislation broadened rights
protection beyond race to include national origin, gender, religious belief, and color. But what is
often overlooked in reviewing the evolution of the Civil Rights movement is that the
pathbreaking laws of the 1960s were enacted at a time when immigration levels were still low
and sharply restrictive. With regard to the employment implications of the civil rights laws of the
1960s, the assumption was that they would reduce future discriminatory practices and that they
would also be accompanied by other human resource development policies designed to redress
the past denial of opportunities for victim groups to be prepared to qualify for jobs. In the short
run, this is, in fact, what occurred. Simultaneous legislation was adopted pertaining to
education, training, health, housing, community development and poverty prevention. With
unemployment declining in the mid-1960s, it was assumed that the newly protected groups --
blacks in particular -- would soon become qualified to fill the available jobs that a tightening
labor market was providing (unemployment rates in the mid-1960s were in the 3 percent range).
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There was no recognition at the time that the parallel reforms in the nation's immigration
system that were manifested the Immigration Act of 1965 were in anyway linked to the
happenings in the civil rights arena. For as the floor manager of the legislation, Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, stated during the final floor debate, "this bill is not concerned with increasing
immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply in selection of
immigrants."62 Neither of his assertions proved valid. As indicated earlier, this legislation (and
other expansive measures that followed) led to the largest increase in immigration in U.S.
history and it is still going on. Moreover, most of the new immigrants have been unskilled, poorly
educated, non-English speaking persons. In the process, policies designed to bring black
America into the nation's economic mainstream were undermined. The new immigrants poured
into many of the same urban centers where the black population was already concentrated.
They became an alternative source of labor -- just as immigrants at the turn of the Century had
been earlier. In the process, their presence has greatly lessened the need to address the
economic plight of black Americans. It has also greatly increased the competition for jobs
(especially in the secondary labor market) and for the scarce education and training funds
available to improve the chronic human capital deficiencies of the needy people of all races
concentrated in these urban centers.
Since the return of mass immigration in the mid-1960s, there are clear signs that the
economic status of black Americans has deteriorated. Historically, the black male labor force
participation rate consistently exceeded that of white males. Beginning in the late 1950s and
accelerating in the 1960s, the white male rate has exceeded the black rate and the gap between
the two has tended to widen. In 1990, the white male rate exceeded the black male rate by 6.8
percentage points (76.9 percent to 70.1 percent). The wide gap exists for every age
sub-grouping. Indicative of the significance of this decline in black male participation is the fact
that the absolute number of black women in the labor force in 1990s exceeds that of black men.
Blacks are the only racial group in the U.S. labor force where this phenomenon occurs and the
difference is projected by the U.S. Department of Labor to worsen throughout the 1990s. On the
surface, there is to be no reason why white males should have a significantly higher
participation rate for every age cohort than black males or that white males should have a
considerably higher overall rate. Given that the black population is considerably younger than
the white population, standard labor market analysis would predict that the black male labor
force participation rate should be higher than the white rate. However, blacks are clustered
disproportionately in the central cities of 12 major cities outside the South, in most central cities
of the South, as well as being scattered throughout the large geographic area of the rural South.
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Jobs in these specific locations are frequently scarce. Moreover, black male workers have been
disproportionately displaced by the decline in manufacturing industries and production-related
occupations that has occurred since the 1960s because they were disproportionately employed
in these sectors.63 In urban centers, therefore, unskilled immigrants and unskilled blacks have
had to compete for the shrinking number of unskilled jobs that remain.
The low participation rate also reflects, in part, the fact that black male unemployment is
about twice that of white males -- also a trend that has worsened since the mid-1950s. The
combination of high unemployment and declining labor force participation means that a
significant number of black males cannot find jobs and many have simply stopped actively
seeking work. If these adult black males are not at work, or in school, or in the military, what are
they doing to survive? The answer, of course, is that an urban subclass of adult black males
who function outside the normal labor market has been formed and institutionalized.64 It
survives through reliance on irregular activities such as casual "off the books" work and
anti-social behavior such as crime. It also entails such self-d structive activity as
disproportionate involvement with alcoholism, drug abuse, and violence.
The worsening economic plight of black males is also affecting black females in
particular and black family structure in general. Up until the 1950s, black women married at
higher proportions than did white women. By 1991, the proportion of black women who do not
ever marry had reached an incredible figure of 25 percent of all black women (three times
higher than the comparable percentage for white women).65 The explanation for this disparity
rests with the fact that the pool of black men who are able to earn a living through work in the
regular economy sufficient to support a family is rapidly shrinking. It is not only the negative
effects of being disproportionately employed in low wage occupations, or the high incidence of
unemployment, or the inordinately high incarceration rates of black men. It is also do to the
soaring death rate -- especially from homicide -- of urban black males. The derivative effects on
black family structure has been devastating. In 1990, 57.6 percent of all black births were out of
wedlock (compared to 17.2 percent for whitest and 23.2 percent for Hispanics.66 Female heads
of households with children, especially those who are from minorities groups, are usually
condemned to lives of poverty as are their offspring.
Returning to the link between immigration and the economic well-being of blacks, it
should be noted that 24 percent of the foreign born population of the nation in 1990 lived in only
seven cities. These cities and the percentage of their respective populations who are foreign
born in 1990 are as follows: New York (28 percent); Los Angeles (38 percent); Chicago 117
percent); Houston (18 percent); San Francisco (34 percent); San Diego (21 percent); and Miami
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(60 percent). With the exception of San Diego, each of these cities also have substantial black
populations.
Competition from immigrants is not the only factor to explain the high unemployment and
the low labor force participation rates of black males but it must be included within any such list
of negative influences. The adverse impact has been highlighted by studies of the 1992 urban
riots in Los Angeles, California -- the worst race riots the country has ever sustained.67 Specific
case studies are rare but one such study in southern California clearly documented the situation
whereby black janitorial workers, who had successfully built a strong union in the 1970s that
provided high wages and good working conditions, were almost totally displaced by Hispanic
immigrants in the 1980s who were willing to work for far lower pay and with few benefits.68
Studies of the New York City labor market, which has the highest absolute number of
foreign born persons of any city in the nation, have found that immigrant workers are clustered
into only a few industries. Almost half (47 percent) of all post-1965 immigrants were employed in
only 13 industries lout of over 200 for which Census data are collected).69 These 13 industries,
however, accounted for an incredible 35 percent of all employed persons in the city. The
preponderance of the post-1965 foreign born-workers were concentrated in generally low
paying industries such as apparel manufacturing, hospitals, eating and drinking establishments,
private household work, hotels, and nursing facilities.
There is also evidence that immigrants, who themselves become employers and who
have opened their own businesses in urban cities, actively discriminate against native born
workers -- especially blacks -- in their hiring practices. In her study of immigrants in New York
City, Elizabeth Bogen candidly described the phenomenon: "there are tens of thousands of jobs
in New York City for which the native born are not candidates."70 The reasons she cites are that
"ethnic hiring networks and the proliferation of immigrant-owned small businesses in the city
have cut off open-market competition for jobs" and that the blatant "discrimination against native
workers is a matter for future monitoring."71 Even research in those rural labor markets where
immigrant workers have become a significant factor (e.g., in the agriculture industry of the
Southwest) has revealed the widespread use of ethnic networking which dominates the hiring
process.72 The negative effect of immigrant hiring networks on the employment of native born
workers for these unskilled, rural jobs is the same in its consequences as it is in urban labor
markets. The concept of networking is highly praised by many scholars who study the current
immigrant experience.73 But what is overlooked is that these hiring practices -- th  use of
national origin as a factor to favor or to deny employment opportunities -- is specifically banned
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. What was legally permissible at the beginning of the 20th
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Century is illegal its end. So far, however, no government agency has been willing to pursue the
issue of discrimination by immigrants against native born Americans - specially if they are black
citizens.
Immigration is also having another more subtle effect on equity issues in the United
States. Namely, due to its scale and composition, immigration is rapidly changing the balance of
political power in those cities and states that have been receiving most of the post-1965
immigrants. No racial group since the United States achieved its independence in 1783 has
received fewer new members as immigrants than has the black population. When the 19th
Century began, blacks constituted about 20 percent of the U.S. population. By the end of the
19th Century, the mass immigration of whites from Europe had led to the reduction in the
proportion of the black population to about 10 percent. Throughout the 20th Century, there has
been little increase in the black population as the result of immigration.74 As n ted earlier,
almost all of the post-1965 immigration to the United States has been of people who presently
constitute other minority groups -- Hispanics and Asians. There have been relatively few blacks
among their numbers. Thus, one of the most dramatic effects of post-1965 immigration has
been to create a significant shift in the make-up of the nation's minority population. As Jeffrey
Passel and Barry Edmonston have written,
The proportion of the minority population [of the United States] that is black has
been dropping steadily. This trend passed a little-noticed threshold in the 1990
Census. For the first time, the black population now accounts for less than half of
the minority population.75
Looking ahead to the 21st Century, they state that "we can expect this shift to have profound
implications for political and social relations among race/ethnic groups in the United States."76
Under most circumstances, the fact that the racial and ethnic composition of the United
States is changing would not warrant concern for policy changes to avoid such an outcome. But
the economic welfare and the social status of blacks in the United States is a special case. The
historical treatment of blacks has placed special obligations on succeeding generations of
Americans to try to right the wrongs of the past. There may be legitimate disagreements among
Americans over the extent to which such a correction can be achieved by public policy
interventions into labor markets; but certainly no discretionary element of public policy should be
allowed to inflict harm upon black Americans in their quest for equality of opportunity.
Unfortunately, post-1965 immigration policy cannot pass that test. Indeed, it has been inimical.
To be sure, this was not the goal of immigration reformers in the 1960s or of pro-immigration
supporters over the subsequent years. But to allow the prevailing immigration system to
continue to function without regard for its adverse effects on blacks can only lead to one
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conclusion: immigration policy has once more become a form of institutional racism. It has
provided a way to avoid addressing the dire economic plight of black Americans.
To date, equity considerations have been ignored in the design, and the assessment of
the nation's post-1965 revival of mass immigration. The adverse consequences of this omission
has fallen most severely on unskilled workers in general but on black workers in particular
because they are, unfortunately, concentrated in the unskilled labor market and often in the
same geographic labor markets most highly impacted by immigration.
In the case of Canada, the issue of equity is an issue but far less so than in the case of
the United States. In the past, the use of the point system and the flexibility in the annual
immigration ceiling has made its system more accountable for its economic consequences than
in the United States. Nonetheless, as the number of immigrants admitted on the basis of family
ties and as refugees has increased and with its immigration levels in the 1990s being allowed to
reach unprecedented levels despite rising unemployment, equity concerns about the impact on
unskilled workers bears careful monitoring in the coming years.77 It is a latent issue.
Immigration has, at times, become ensnared in Canada's timeless dispute between its
charter ethnic groups, the British and the French. But once Canada decided to adopt an active
policy of recruitment of immigrants in the post-World War II era, it was not long before Canada
followed the lead of the United States by enacting legislation in 1967 that removed
discriminatory barriers from its entry system. In the succeeding years, the number of immigrants
who are neither of British or French heritage has risen dramatically -especially with immigrants
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.78 But without the legacy of slavery and de jure
segregation, Canada's immigration system has not been as plagued by the equity concerns
about differential impacts on native born racial groups as has the United States.
As for the receiving countries in Western Europe, the major equity issues are far less
obvious since the era of reliance on guestworkers has ended in 1973. The guestworker
programs have been soundly criticized on equity grounds by W.R. Bohning who described their
demise as being due to the fact that they were "not only morally offensive but politically less and
less tenable" for Western European democracies.79 Ray Rist, for instance, contended that the
program created a marginal segment of the labor force in the receiving countries of workers who
were only useful as long as there was no attempt to improve their working and living conditions
or to incorporate them into the economic mainstream of the respective host countries.80
Since 1973, as discussed earlier, the  member nations of the European Economic
Community have sought to reduce immigration from non-member nations while increasing labor
mobility between EEC members. The adoption of the Single European Act in December, 1985
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(that became effective in 1993) sought to codify this position. Given the high unemployment that
continues to characterize most EEC nations and the spread of long-term unemployment among
its work force, this course of action is logical.81 The EEC countries no longer need an infusion of
unskilled workers – from Africa, the Near East or anywhere else. Hence, when faced with a
choice of “a very restrictive immigration policy or … a more liberal one which is racist” [i.e., an
employment-based policy that favors only immigrants who speak the native language of the
receiving country and who already have needed skills, talents, and education], they have
chosen the former.82 The EEC nations will, however, still be confronted with the legacy issues
that are the residual effects of their guestworker programs – family reunification and illegal
immigration. The associated equity issues, therefore, will center on equal access to jobs and job
preparation for their foreign born populations as well as with citizenship rights and cultural
assimilation issues. The entry question, it seems, has been decided: Western Europe no longer
desires to be a receiving region. The dilemma of how Europe will handle continuing illegal
immigration and the on-going surge of economic refugees masquerading as political asylum
applicants, it seems, will determine the fate of access and treatment of future immigrants.
Effects on Social Policy
Western Europe has led the world in the development of social policies that are
designed to smooth over the hard edges of free market economies for workers and their
families. Competitive economic systems breed winners and losers, by definition. The
maintenance of full employment for prolonged periods has proven to be difficult. Under these
circumstances, most Western European countries have concluded that income guarantees for
families with children, health care, school-to-work transition programs, support for unions, and
liberal unemployment compensation programs are societal obligations that require societal
responses. Public policy measures reflect these views. Canada has tended to resemble Europe
in its adherence to these beliefs and the establishment of similar protective programs. As for the
United States, it has been less willing to acknowledge the fact that free markets have problems
that dictate social solutions. But, in fact, it has tended to follow Western European leadership in
these vital areas of social policy but, usually, with great reluctance and considerable time
lapses. Some social policies – such as the provision of universal health care and children
allowances – are still resisted.
These social policies, however, are expensive. Their continuation and adequacy
depends on the ability to keep their costs from becoming prohibitive. As long as immigration
levels were low, the benefits of the welfare state were not threatened and the immigrants were
usually included with a minimum of opposition. But as suggested by Becker, these social
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programs can serve as a human magnet to poor people in less developed countries to emigrate
from their homelands. Indeed, they may be as powerful in there attraction powers as are the
opportunities for possible employment that emanate from the job market of the receiving
nations. When immigration is perceived to be “out of control” (as a presidential commission in
the United States has found it to be), the cost of providing human services to immigrants and
refugees can undermine the tenuous support and possibly even the continuation of the social
policies of these receiving nations. They can also hinder efforts to enhance these programs by
providing higher benefits and wider coverage in response to worsening domestic economic
conditions (in Western Europe and in Canada) and fiscal stress (in the United States) in the
1990s.
In the United States, support by special interest groups for higher levels of immigration
and for weak deterrence measures against illegal immigration has been based on alleged
benefits that accrue by these developments. They have conscientiously eschewed discussions
of the associated costs. Immigration advocates had their way in the 1980s. But given the
anomaly of the immigration policy process in the United States (whereby immigration policy is
the exclusive prerogative of the federal government but most of the actual adjustment costs fall
on local and state governments to bear), the issue of costs had to be faced eventually. The local
and state governments where immigrants have congregated have manifested a groundswell of
protest as they have struggled to pay the mounting financial obligations of immigration. In 1994,
for example, the Governor of California charged that immigration was costing his state $3 billion
annually and he filed suit against the federal government for compensation of the cost of
incarceration of criminal aliens ($1.6 billion) and for providing health costs to illegal aliens ($369
million); San Diego Country, California filed suit for an addition $59 million to cover the costs of
criminal incarceration; the Governor of Florida released a report claiming that the cost of illegal
immigration was costing his state $884 million to provide education, health, and incarceration
costs; the New York State Senate released a report claiming that immigration was costing the
state $5.6 billion for social services, incarceration, and education and announced it would begin
negotiations with the federal government for reimbursement of these expenses; a study in
Texas placed the annual costs of legal and illegal immigrants at $4.6 billion for its governmental
services; and the Attorney General of Arizona filed a federal suite for $121 million for
reimbursement for the cost of criminal incarcerations.83 Other states are considering similar
actions. These suite are only the tip of the iceberg. The actual costs of mass immigrant
accommodation have yet to be fully exposed. For example, it is estimated that two million
immigrant youth enrolled in U.S. public schools in the 1980s. Studies of these immigrant
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children indicate that they are “twice as likely to be poor as compared to all students, thereby
straining local school resources.”84 Moreover, “many immigrants, including those of high school
age, have had little or no schooling and are illiterate even in their native languages.”85 New
demands for the creation of bilingual programs are special education classes have added to the
costs of education had have frequently led to the diversion of funds from other important
programs for other needy children. Overcrowding of urban schools, already confronting
enormous education burdens, has frequently occurred with devastating impacts on the
educational process.86 Other education costs to social policy are more subtle but equally
significant as financial concerns. Namely, the societal goal of desegregated urban schools has
been greatly retarded by the arrival of immigrant children because it has increased the racial
isolation of inner-city black children.87
Even the federal government itself has entered the fray over costs by reporting that
elderly legal immigrants, who entered under family reunification provisions and who did not work
in the United States so they do not qualify for Social Security benefits, are annually costing the
federal government $1.2 billion in food stamp and Supplemental Security Income benefits.88
Research has also disclosed that immigrants in the 1980s made greater use of the federal-state
welfare program for dependant children than did native born citizens.89 In addition, the issue of
coverage for illegal immigrants under the national health care program proposed by the Clinton
Administration in 1994 has become a major point of contention to an already controversial
proposal as has the issue of the eligibility of children of illegal immigrants under the
Administration's proposed welfare reforms.90
Thus, there is a quandary developing in each of the receiving nations. As the number of
immigrants -- a disproportionate number of who are poor -- enter these countries, the cost of
accommodating them in the social programs of these nations are disproportionately increased.
In the wake of rising costs, there is pressure to exclude needy immigrants. But such actions
would create an untenable two-tiered society that is likely to have intergenerational effects.
Another alternative is to retain the existing programs but reduce benefit levels and restrict
coverage for everyone but this too is arbitrary and cruel. It too would widen the income gap
between "haves" and "have nots" and be socially divisive. This leaves only one remaining
option: reform immigration policies by making them accountable for their economic and social
consequences. Western Europe has chosen this last option. In the United States and Canada,
the choice remains to be made but the day of reckoning does not seem far away.
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Concluding Observations
From the vantage point of the receiving countries, the planned immigration component of
international labor migration is limited and situation-specific. Few countries currently are willing
to admit immigrants. Those that do, have been willing to do so under very proscribed terms and
with set limits. The legal grounds are based largely on noneco mic, political considerations.
But, as the economic consequences of these political policies have begun to surface and to be
recognized as being significant, support for immigration for permanent settlement has waned.
Contraction has already begun in Western Europe. In Canada and the United States, planned
immigration remains high, but it has become a subject of contentious debate with the future
outcome uncertain. In Australia, levels of immigration have been reduced while arguments over
the proper admission criteria continue.
Faced with "stress" in their domestic economies that is symbolized by high
unemployment and caused by the introduction of new labor-displacing technologies and the
reduction of international trade barriers, employers are rapidly readjusting their production
systems. The employment responses to these changes have revealed significant labor market
mismatches between the types of skilled and educated workers that are needed and the supply
of unskilled workers who are not.91 Structural unemployment of this nature is not amenable to
conventional fiscal and monetary remedies. In this economic environment, labor market policies
come to the forefront. Immigration, which is a discretionary element of each nation's labor
policies, has come under particular scrutiny. None of the receiving nations need more unskilled
workers. But, given the political nature of their existing immigration policies (i.e., the admission
of family reunification immigrants, diversity immigrants, and refugees), it is unskilled workers
that dominate the overall inflow into their respective labor forces.
All of the countries that are receiving immigrants for permanent settlement have liberal
welfare systems in place. This is especially the case in Western Europe, but the United States
has been gradually adding to its inventory of social programs. Confronted with the imperative to
create jobs for their unemployed while striving to protect the integrity of their social welfare
policies, it is not surprising that there would be resistance to immigration policies that add to the
eligibility pools; necessitate increased social expenditures; and add to the ranks of the
unemployed.92
But, aside from the direct cost issues, there is also the fact that the job competition
impact of immigration is grossly uneven. It is not the better educated and highly skilled
segments of the labor force that bears most of the effects of the competition. Rather, it is the low
skilled and low paid workers of each country who bear these burdens. Disproportionately, these
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workers tend to be youth, women, and minority group members. The result, therefore, is that
immigration policy in its present form represents a societal imposition of hardship on precisely
the segments of the population and labor force that are in the greatest of need of both
assistance and protection.
To be sure, many of the immigrants and their families are fleeing circumstances that are
often worse than the conditions confronting unskilled citizen workers and their families in the
receiving nations. But, adding needy immigrants to the ranks of the needy citizens of these
countries raises serious equity concerns. No policy that makes it more difficult to provide
adequate job opportunities, health care, education, and housing for needy citizens can possibly
be in the national interest of any nation -- even if the immigrants themselves are better-off in
these countries than if they stayed in their homelands.
As for unplanned (i.e., illegal) immigration, all of these countries that are currently
receiving immigrants are experiencing the phenomena -- b  they unauthorized border crossers,
visa "overstayers", or economic refugees claiming political asylum. The issue of unplanned
immigration, however, is not restricted to the few nations who are admitting legal immigrants. It
seems to occur on every continent, wherever any one country is better off than are its
neighbors. But it is a special problem for the advanced industrial democracies because of the
absolute number of people involved and because they attract illegal immigrants from multiple
sources, not just neighboring countries. All of these industrial democracies have taken
legislative steps to curtail illegal immigration. But still it continues and, in fact, it increases. David
North has succinctly explained why: "I suggest that democracies do not control international
migration well because they are reluctant to devote the needed financial, diplomatic, intellectual,
and above all, emotional resources to the issue."93 Thus, while the industrial democracies do
pass laws against illegal immigration, there "is an articulate and powerful set of interest groups
which are not sympathetic to the enforcement of immigration law."94 Chief among these are
certain business groups who hire large numbers of low skilled workers (e.g., agri-business in the
United States). But the coalition also includes influential organizations of ethnic, racial, and
religious groups who are largely concerned with increasing their numbers rather than the
interests of the nation as a whole. They are joined by a growing number of powerful
organizations that exist only to serve immigrants and refugees and whose institutional existence
depends entirely on a continuation of immigrant flows. The collective influences of these entities
keeps immigration enforcement a low priority issue. To be effective, as North indicates far more
funds are needed to make the existing laws work than the governments of the receiving nation's
are presently willing to appropriate; the topic must be given higher diplomatic priority even if the
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result is an increase in ill-will generated by the governments of the sending countries; more
attention needs to be given by immigration scholars to nitty-gritty issues pertaining to the actual
means of law enforcement; and the receiving nations must overcome the feeling of emotional
guilt about sending violators back to their homelands in order to discourage even a greater
number from coming in the future. Although North is pessimistic about the prospects of the
industrial democracies taking these steps, he clearly articulates the imperative for doing so:
The big losers are the disadvantaged legal workers, often of minority origin, who
either lose their jobs to newcomers, or, more often, find their wages and working
conditions depressed because of the presence of newcomers in a specific
segment of the labor market .... If the State provides welfare benefits to the
displaced domestic workers, then taxpayers are lesser losers as well.95
Thus, there is an anomaly in any effort to appraise the international labor mobility
aspects of global immigration on receiving nations. On the one hand, the planned immigration
component of such movements is small and the future prospect is that it will diminish; on the
other hand, unplanned immigration -- i  all of its forms -- shows every sign of enlargement.
Consequently, the magnitude of international migration is likely to increase despite formal efforts
to reduce it.
The scale of international labor migration, therefore, will more likely be determined by
what is happening in the sending countries than in the receiving nations. The economic
problems confronting the sending countries, which cause so many of their people to leave, are
immense and the prospect is that they will worsen. But, to the degree that humane solutions for
their plight do exist, out-migration cannot be one of them. For aside from the adverse effects on
the receiving countries, out-migration alone does nothing to resolve the fundamental causes of
the problems in their homelands. Until they are addressed directly, the "push" factors in the
sending countries will simply go on indefinitely. If the "have" countries of the world want to help,
they must address the systemic causes of distress in those countries whose leaders themselves
want to change these conditions. Fundamental to the success of any such effort are the
acceptance of the need for population control measures. The "have" nations could provide the
birth control information and the contraceptive means to limit family size and population growth.
They can provide the technical and the economic assistance needed to develop the education
and training of their work forces as well as the production expertise needed to diversify their
existing industrial bases so as to introduce new industries and to expand domestic job
opportunities. They can also adopt trade policies that provide access to the sending nations to
export to their countries. The advanced industrial countries should link the provision of
economic assistance and trade concessions to assurances by the governments of these
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countries that they will strictly adhere to international human rights and human liberty standards.
And, lastly, the receiving countries should resist the temptation to "brain drain" the sending
countries of the talent they need to develop their economies. Pursuit of these international
policies is far more preferable, in terms of probable outcomes, than is the option of expanding
international labor migration itself.
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Table 1: Gross Inflows of Foreign Population to Selected Countries, 1985-1990 (thousands)
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Europe
Belgium 37.5 39.3 40.1 38.2 43.5 52.3
Francea 43.4 38.3 39.0 44.0 53.2 63.1
Germany 324.4 378.6 414.9 545.4 649.5 NA
Netherlands 40.6 46.9 47.4 50.8 51.5 60.1
Norwayb 14.9 16.5 15.2 16.4 14.0 11.7
Swedenc 13.4 19.4 19.0 24.9 28.9 23.9
Switzerlandd 59.4 66.8 71.5 76.1 80.4 101.4
United Kingdome 55.4 47.8 46.0 49.3 49.7 52.4
North America
Canadaf 84.3 99.2 152.1 161.9 192.0 213.6
United Statesf 570.0 601.7 601.5 643.0 1,090.9 1,536.5
SOURCE: Systeme d' Observation Permanente des Migration (SOPEMI) of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (Paris), 1992. Asylum seekers excluded.
a Includes holders of provisional work permits and foreigners admitted on family reunification grounds. Does not
include residents of EEC countries who have not been brought in by the International Migration Office.
b Entries of foreigners intending to stay longer than six months.
c Some short duration entries are not counted.
d Entries of foreigners with annual permits and those with permanent permits who return after a temporary stay
abroad. Seasonal and frontier workers are excluded.
e Entries correspond to permanent settlers within the meaning of the 1971 Immigration Act and subsequent
amendments.
f Permanent settlers only.
[Note: This table is taken from Beth J. Ash, Emigration and Its Effects on the Sending Countries, (Santa Monica:
RAND, 1994). Table 1.1, p. 4].
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